On November 19th, CSCC had the pleasure of welcoming Professor Jiaqi Liu, Assistant Professor of sociology at Singapore School of Management. In his talk, Professor Liu reexamined Chinese diaspora politics through the lens of state-society relations, in an effort to better understand the motives of Chinese diaspora participation in Chinese politics.
The media frequently depicts politically active members of the Chinese diaspora as unwavering supporters of the Chinese Communist Party, but Liu argues this portrayal is a distortion of reality. He further notes, as many of his peers have, that such rhetoric increasingly resembles a modern-day Red Scare. Given China's central role in this narrative, Liu asserts that much of the Red Scare discourse is infused with Sinophobia and echoes of Yellow Perilism. However, this is not necessarily a one-sided issue. Professor Liu remarks that the PRC’s own statements could be contributing to the problem. China designates their diaspora as “grassroots ambassadors” that are able to promote Chinese soft power abroad, and that due to inherent patriotism, many Chinese migrants are willing to connect with China. Even so, Liu remarks that many of these migrants have their own push and pull factors motivating them to engage with their home country.
Most of these diaspora leaders (侨领) are first generation male migrants nearing the age of retirement, and because of their status in their host society, they often feel compelled to engage with the party. Due to limited education, engagement in low-wage labor, and lack of foreign language knowledge, Liu notes that many find it an everyday necessity to stand out and regain “symbolic capital.” As a means to compensate for their blocked social mobility, these leaders host events, set up organizations, and even become involved in China’s efforts to repress overseas dissidents. This, however, doesn’t just come from their own motivation, but also comes from pressure from their hometown officials.
In the mainland, fierce competition fuels hometown officials to performatively govern by expanding their politics abroad to diaspora, motivating the diaspora by granting them with coveted honorary titles and symbolic positions. Liu notes that the “Secret Police Stations” that have been reported in many countries are, in fact, not secret, not stations, and have nothing to do with policing. Instead, he argues, that they are solely performative and symbolic. Competition between rival diaspora hometowns also fuels these diaspora leaders. In an effort to stand out, diaspora leaders in Europe hosted “learning sessions” to study the 20th party congress. These leaders were celebrated by the hometown officials for their great enthusiasm. However, when the leaders were pressed for details, Liu found that these sessions were only meant to stand out to officials. Liu argues that what many might perceive as China’s growing reach among diaspora, is instead, a collective performance between local officials and diaspora leaders. Liu argues that local official’s desire for career promotion coupled with diaspora leaders' need for social recognition creates this transborder symbiosis.
Liu’s research brings a compelling perspective to discussions on Chinese diaspora politics, highlighting how state actions can shape the experiences of citizens living abroad. As global tensions with China rise, the Chinese diaspora is increasingly impacted by the state's actions, both directly and indirectly. This underscores how domestic policy, if not handled thoughtfully, can spill over into foreign policy. However, the responsibility does not rest solely with the Chinese government. Foreign governments and media also influence state-society dynamics, and as Professor Liu’s work illustrates, these interactions can lead to significant and tangible consequences.