On October 2nd, CSCC warmly welcomed Professor Yao Yang from the National School of Development at Peking University to discuss China’s village elections. Professor Yao and his team's research examines the changes in the local elections in China over time and how factors such as local clans can and have affected these elections. In his talk, Professor Yao gave us an overview of the history of rural elections and how policy changes have affected these rural communities.
To understand rural China, Professor Yao points out, one must understand the role that clans play. Clans, usually denoted by a common surname/lineage, have traditionally been the most important social institution in rural China, and society was managed by these clan institutions. Among clans, the dominant clans in each village usually garnered the most power because of their size and social cohesion. After China’s political reform in 1949, the power of clans and other institutions in rural China saw a large-scale decrease. Clans, however, did not disappear.
After 1978, traditional institutions started coming back, and in 1982, the PRC Constitution gave villages the status of self-governing units. This paved the way for elections to take place in villages. In 1987, a tentative version of “The Organic Law of Village Committees” (OLVC) was instituted. By 1990, 70% of villages had their first election, and by 1998, when the final version of OLVC was announced, almost all villages had an election. Since the genesis of these local elections, the village government has been comprised of the village chair, village party secretary, and the remainder of the village committee members. Prior to reforms in 2010, the only non-elected position was the village party secretary. However, after this tightening control on village elections, the village chair also became an appointed position.
Professor Yao notes that a considerable amount of the importance of these village committees comes from their control over village land tenure. The 1982 constitution says that village land is owned by the village as a whole, meaning that village officials hold control over what is arguably the most fundamental livelihood for people in the villages—their land. Professor Yao’s team’s work found that in rural areas, households from the dominant clan had high per capita land holding before the implementation of village elections. After the implementation dominant clans hold a smaller advantage, and this impact has remained since the erosion of electoral quality in 2010. Professor Yao’s research demonstrates that despite reform many traditional aspects of Chinese civilization remain, in particular, clans and lineages. Especially as the CCP continues to place emphasis on the village reform, particularly financial reform as it pertains to local debt, the question remains whether the power of these clans will survive. While they survived the period from 1949 to 1982, there’s no way to predict what will happen in the future. Only time will tell whether continued pressure will start to erode these historical features of rural life and whether that’s to the benefit or loss of villagers.